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Party discipline commonly refers to the ability of party leaders to influence their party mem-
bers to support the party line on the floor of the legislature.1 In modern democracies, party
discipline is often difficult to achieve because legislators have to respond to local needs and
preferences that are sometimes not aligned with the party’s interests. Excessive party loyalty,
therefore, may be electorally costly for legislators. To soften electoral punishment and fos-
ter party discipline, party leaders may reward loyalty. Such rewards can include “favorable
committee assignments and leadership positions, campaign funds, district visits by party no-
tables, federal projects targeted to a member’s district, expedited treatment for a member’s
favorite bills, and invitations to serve as speaker pro tem” (Snyder and Groseclose 2000, p.
194). Narrowly targeted projects may be particularly effective in influencing legislators’ vot-
ing behavior. In 1964, for instance, American President Lyndon Johnson persuaded Arizona
Democrat Carl Hayden to vote in favor of the Civil Rights Act in exchange for the Central
Arizona Water Project that Hayden’s constituents demanded. Some argue that “without a
little pork, Johnson would have been unable to obtain his [Hayden’s] support” (Zelizer, 2014).
More recently, in 2011, the U.S. Congress banned earmarks as they were often associated
with overspending and corruption. However, this came at the cost of the Congress being
more paralyzed and less able to pass fundamental legislation because congressional leaders
could no longer reward and punish rank-and-file members.2 According to Republican former
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, “trying to be a leader where you have no sticks and
very few carrots is dang near impossible.”3 Nowadays, the Congress has reached such a high
level of dysfunction that even Republicans (including President Donald Trump), who have
traditionally opposed earmarks, are suggesting it may be time to bring them back.4
However, besides anecdotal evidence, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the re-
lationship between party discipline and the allocation of discretionary spending.5 The present
1Henceforth, we use the terms party discipline and party loyalty interchangeably.




4See for instance some debates in newspapers and blogs:
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/12/16873520/case-for-and-against-earmarks
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/17/republicans-democrats-agree-need-earmark-spending/
5Discretionary spending typically refers to federal spending that is included in annual appropriation bills,
as opposed to mandatory spending. Also, it is a kind of payment that can be targeted to certain constituencies
and that is not based on objective formulas. Henceforth, we use the terms discretionary spending and pork-
barrel spending interchangeably.
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paper contributes to this line of research by proposing and testing empirically a novel theory
that identifies the condition under which party discipline is likely to influence government
spending. In our model, voters condition a politician’s reelection on the policy outcome she
decides to implement, as well as on the amount of funds she attracts for her constituency. If
the politician (who is purely office-motivated) follows the party line instead of voters’ inter-
ests, the potential electoral punishment can be partly (or totally) offset by larger spending
targeted to her constituency. The party leader, who is in charge of allocating government
spending, offers a contract to the politician conditioning the allocation of spending on the
politician’s loyalty to the party line. In this context, the closer the policy outcome to the
party line, the more loyal the politician is. Our model predicts that higher levels of party
loyalty are associated with greater amounts of targeted spending. Most importantly, this
effect is greater the more intense the conflict between the party leader’s preferences and the
voters’ interests.
To investigate empirically the relationship between party discipline and discretionary
spending, we use a dataset of congressional districts in the United States that includes in-
formation on representation and party discipline in the House of Representatives and federal
grants between 1986 and 2010. We focus on party loyalty in legislative voting and use as
a measure of discipline the party unity scores published yearly by Congressional Quarterly.
These scores are based on roll-call votes in which the majority of Democrats oppose the ma-
jority of Republicans, also known as unity votes. Unity scores are calculated as the percentage
of unity votes in which a representative voted along her party line. In addition, to measure
the intensity of conflict between the party’s and voters’ interests, we use districts’ vote shares
in the preceding presidential elections. The results of presidential elections are commonly
used to measure district ideology in the liberal-conservative dimension. Larger vote shares
of a Republican (Democratic) presidential candidate in districts represented by Democratic
(Republican) House members indicate a larger gap between constituents’ and party’s inter-
ests. As for the type of federal grants, we restrict our analysis to spending programs that have
a large variation over time within districts and are likely to be allocated according to discre-
tionary rules. Thus, this type of expenditure is more susceptible to political manipulation
and targeting.
We apply two estimation strategies to examine empirically our theoretical predictions.
The first strategy is to include district and year fixed effects as well as a set of legislators’
observable characteristics (e.g., partisanship) and district characteristics (e.g., whether the
district partisanship aligns with that of the House majority or the President). The inclusion
of district fixed effects mitigates to a certain extent the potential omitted-variable bias. How-
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ever, another concern is the simultaneity bias. To address this issue, we instrument party
discipline with a two-year lag of party unity scores. Given that congressional elections take
place every two years and that our analysis focuses on new payments (excluding multi-year
projects), it is unlikely that current spending is exchanged for future discipline, when neither
leaders nor rank-and-file members can predict their electoral prospects.
According to our results, a one-standard deviation increase in party unity scores raises
discretionary spending by 18% on average. We also find, in line with our theoretical predic-
tions, that a one-standard deviation increase in conflict intensity raises the reward to party
discipline by about 5%. According to our results, the OLS estimates underestimate the true
effect of party discipline. A possible explanation is that party discipline is targeted to legis-
lators who would otherwise disregard the party line. If this is effective in changing their vote
then observed values of party discipline are already the result of higher levels of spending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the related
literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical model and derives its empirical implications.
Section 4 describes the data and illustrates the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the
estimation results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our theoretical model contributes to the formal literature on party discipline, which comprises
several approaches. Some researchers have elaborated on informational arguments, pointing
out that strong party discipline informs voters about the future policy of a candidate who,
once elected, cannot deviate from the party’s official platform (Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita 2004; Castanheira and Crutzen 2010; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Snyder and Ting
2002). In a similar vein, Grossman and Helpman (2008) defined party discipline as a party’s
ability to induce ex-post adherence to a pre-announced position. Party discipline, therefore,
is a valuable asset for the party leaders because it signals cohesion and thus helps build a
political brand (Cox and McCubbins 1993). In several other studies, party discipline has
been modeled as the ability of the party leadership to control its members in the legislature
such that they vote in line with the party’s ideological position (Colomer 2005; Eguia 2011;
Iaryczower 2008; McGillivray 1997; Patty 2008; Volden and Bergman 2006). In these models,
the party leader’s objective is to discipline party members who might have different ideological
preferences. Among these studies, the most related to ours is Iaryczower (2008) who analyzed
a similar setting but focused on the impacts of partisan promises (such as nomination to party
lists) on loyalty in voting. He defined party discipline as “power of partisan promises to induce
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behavior different than in a non-partisan benchmark” (p. 205), and modeled pork-barrel
spending as a tool to coordinate party members’ beliefs about the leader’s ability to provide
future partisan benefits. We do not consider partisan promises but rather concentrate on
the conditions under which party loyalty is likely to influence pork-barrel spending. In turn,
Diermeier and Feddersen (1998a,b) provided an institutional explanation for cohesive voting
of legislators in parliamentary systems. The authors showed that the vote-of-confidence
procedure common in parliamentary democracies creates an incentive for cohesion in voting.
Although these studies formally analyzed party discipline, little research has been con-
ducted on the impacts of party loyalty on the allocation of discretionary spending. We are
aware of only one formal study that addresses this question. Grossman and Helpman (2008)
investigate how differences in party discipline affect national spending on local public goods.
In the study’s setting, however, party discipline is modeled as an exogenously given insti-
tutional variable—an “extent of commitment to party platforms” (p. 330). In the present
paper, we endogenize party discipline by modeling explicitly the politician’s and the party
leader’s problems.
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature on party discipline, which has
mostly focused on the political consequences of loyalty. There is evidence of loyal legislators
incurring electoral punishment in the polls (Carson et al. 2010). Some studies have shown
that party lines affect legislators’ voting behavior on the floor of the legislature (Heller and
Mershon 2008; Krehbiel 2000; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Rohde 1991; Snyder and
Groseclose 2000). Barber, Canes-Wrone and Godbout (2014) also found that, in the US,
majority party leaders reward loyalty in roll-call voting with campaign contributions to run
in upcoming elections.
Our paper is also related to the studies on the relationship between legislative repre-
sentation and the geographic distribution of public spending. Atlas et al. (1995) find that
per-capita federal spending is correlated with per-capita representation in the U.S. Senate.
Using data on U.S. transportation projects, Knight (2004) finds that legislators are more
likely to support federal spending the higher their own-district spending and the lower the
tax burden borne. Knight (2008) analyzed the relationship between legislative representation
and the geographic distribution of federal spending. He finds that small U.S. states receive
more funding in the Senate, while large U.S. states receive more funding in the House. In
turn, Albouy (2013) finds that U.S. states represented by the majority party members re-
ceive more federal funds than those represented by members in the minority. More broadly,
this paper contributes to the literature on distributive politics that focuses on the political
distribution of public goods. Most of this literature focuses on four main political factors
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that influence the distribution of government spending: core and swing districts (Lindbeck
and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996), partisan favoritism (Arulampalam et al. 2009;
Brollo and Nannicini 2012), clientelism (Stokes et al. 2013), and political budget cycles (Shi
and Svensson 2016).6
Although these studies have empirically investigated party loyalty and the allocation
of federal funds as unrelated topics, evidence for the relationship between party discipline
and discretionary spending is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have
addressed this issue, and the results are mixed. Primo and Snyder (2010) find that, for the
years 1957-1970, U.S. states with strong party organizations received less federal spending
than states with weaker parties.7 However, the result is no longer statistically significant once
state fixed effects are included. A negative relationship between legislative party strength
and federal grants would be at odds with the fact that since the early 1990s and until 2011,
when earmarks were banned, the U.S. has experienced an increase in party cohesion and
pork-barrel spending. This pattern is more consistent with the idea of pork as a reward for
party loyalty. Pearson (2008) suggests that this may be the case: “When party leaders in both
chambers finalize the details of major legislation, they have opportunities to reward loyalty.
The increasing number of earmarks added in conference committee or during budget summit
negotiation may provide limited opportunities to reward loyalty” (p. 113). This observation
is in line with the findings of Cann and Sidman (2011) who report a positive correlation
between party loyalty and government spending for U.S. representatives in 2002-2009.
We depart from Cann and Sidman’s analysis in several ways. First, our model identifies
the conditions under which party discipline is likely to be highly rewarded (i.e., in the dis-
tricts with conflict between the constituents’ interests and the party line). If no conflict of
interest exists, then legislators vote along party lines simply because the constituents’ pref-
erences are aligned with the party’s. In this case, a positive relationship between spending
and discipline is just a spurious correlation. Second, we expand the time period to the years
1986-2010. This is important because in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a larger number
of Republican representatives in liberal-leaning districts and Democrat representatives in
conservative-leaning districts. Third, to address the potential bias due to simultaneity be-
tween loyalty and spending, we use an instrumental variables approach in contrast to Cann
and Sidman’s random-effects model.
6See Golden and Min (2013) for an extensive review.
7Their measure of party strength is an index constructed by Zeller (1954), who classifies states as those
with strong party organizations and those with weak party organizations. The classification is based on the
results of a survey conducted among experts.
6
3 Model
Consider a politician who decides on policy x. The set of feasible policies is taken to be the
closed interval [0, l], l > 0. The politician is assumed to be purely office-motivated and to
maximize her reelection probability denoted by Pr (·).
There is a representative voter with bliss point 0 who cares about the policy outcome x
according to the function v (x), where v : [0, l]→ R is a strictly decreasing, twice-differentiable
and concave function. Therefore, the voter prefers the policy to be as close as possible to
his bliss point 0. The voter also values discretionary spending s that enters linearly into his
utility function
uV (x, s) = v (x) + s.
One can think of s as specific projects or public goods.
The voter decides on the politician’s reelection. He realizes that the politician wants to
be reelected. Therefore, the politician can be held accountable for the policy outcome and
discretionary spending at the moment of the election. We assume that the voter conditions
the politician’s reelection on the voter’s utility uV (x, s) from policy x and spending s. The
higher uV (x, s), the more likely the voter is to reelect the incumbent. The probability of
reelection is given by
Pr (x, s) = F (uV (x, s)) ,
where F (·) denotes the cumulative function of a well-behaved continuous distribution with
F ′ (·) > 0.8
The politician is affiliated with a political party. The party leader with bliss point l is
policy-motivated.9 He cares about the policy outcome x according to the function v (l − x).
The party leader thus wants the politician to choose a policy as close as possible to the party
leader’s own bliss point l, which we refer to as the party line.10 However, supporting the party
line is electorally costly for the politician as the voter wants the politician to implement a
policy sufficiently close to his bliss point 0. This implies that there exists a conflict of interest
between the voter’s interests (i.e., his bliss point 0) and the party line (i.e., the party leader’s
8Alternatively, one can assume that the politician cares about her constituency (instead of her reelection
prospects) and so maximizes the voter’s utility uV (x, s) (instead of the reelection probability F (uV (x, s))).
The model predictions do not change in this case.
9In Appendix C, we extend the model by assuming that the party leader is both policy- and office-motivated
with the objective to maximize both his utility from the policy outcome and the politician’s reelection chances.
We show that our theoretical insights hold in this case.
10The assumption that the voter’s and the leader’s bliss points are at the opposite extremes of the policy
space [0, l] is made without loss of generality.
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bliss point l). A larger l makes this conflict between the voter’s and the leader’s interests
more intense.
We assume that the party leader controls the allocation of discretionary spending s ≥ 0
that he can channel to the politician’s constituency (for example, via earmarks).11
The party leader’s utility function is therefore given by
uL (x, s) = v (l − x)− s.
The party leader knows that the politician maximizes her reelection probability Pr (x, s),
which depends on the policy outcome x and on the amount of spending s. Therefore, the
party leader can somehow compensate the politician with spending for supporting the party
line instead of following her constituency’s interests. In other words, the party leader can
reward the politician’s loyalty and discipline with spending channeled to her constituency.
We measure the politician’s loyalty to the party line (i.e., her party discipline) with x. A
larger x means that the politician implements a policy closer to the party line l (and so is
more loyal and disciplined).
The party leader wants the politician to internalize his losses v (l − x) from the imple-
mented policy and so will condition discretionary spending s on these losses. This is modeled
as an explicit contract that maps any possible policy to the spending allocation:
s (x) = max [v (l − x) + α, 0] , (1)
where α ∈ R is a constant chosen optimally by the party leader. The more loyal the politician
(i.e., the closer x to the party line l), the larger the amount of spending is allocated to her
constituency.
The timing of events is as follows. The party leader chooses α and offers s (x) to the
politician, giving a binding promise of spending conditional on the chosen policy level x. The
politician either accepts or rejects this offer (she is assumed to accept if she is indifferent).12
Finally, she chooses policy x. If she is indifferent between several policies, she picks the policy
preferred by the party leader.13
11In the U.S. Congress, party leaders decide when to place bills for consideration and therefore have
opportunities to add a number of earmarks when finalizing the details of major legislation. This suggests
that party leaders have a certain level of power to allocate discretionary spending in their (or their party’s)
interests.
12Alternatively, one can assume that the party leader offers the politician a small positive compensation
ε > 0 in exchange for her accepting the spending offer when she is indifferent.
13Alternatively, one can assume that the party leader offers the politician a small positive compensation
ε > 0 in exchange for her selecting his preferred policy among the policies to which she is indifferent.
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We analyze this game backwards and turn now to the politician’s policy choice and her
decision whether to accept or to reject the party leader’s offer.
Politician’s policy choice Suppose first that the politician rejects the party leader’s
offer s (x). This corresponds to the case with zero spending in which the probability of the
politician being reelected to her office is equal to
Pr (x, 0) = F (v (x)) .
The politician chooses x ∈ [0, l] to maximize this probability. Given that F ′ (·) > 0, she
maximizes v (x) (which is strictly decreasing) and thus picks the voter’s preferred policy 0.
Her probability of reelection is equal to F (v (0)) in this case.
Suppose next that the politician accepts the party leader’s offer s (x) given by (1). Her
reelection probability is then
Pr (x, s (x)) = F (v (x) + max [v (l − x) + α, 0]) .
The politician maximizes Pr (x, s (x)) with respect to x. We denote with x (α) the politician’s
policy choice that depends on the party leader’s choice of α. Pr (α) denotes the corresponding
reelection probability. The politician’s maximization problem is analyzed in Appendix B. The
results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the politician has accepted the party leader’s offer s (x) given by










































Lemma 3.1 suggests that a higher α (i.e., a higher amount of discretionary spending)
makes the politician pick a policy closer to the party leader’s bliss point l, l2 instead of 0.
Even though the voter prefers policy 0 to l2 , in the case of a higher α he gets compensated















≥ F (v (0)).
We next consider the politician’s decision whether to accept or to reject s (x). Comparing
her reelection probability in the case of rejecting, F (v (0)), with that in the case of accepting,
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(3), yields that she has weakly higher chances of being reelected in the latter case. Note that





, she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting s (x).





, she strictly prefers to accept s (x). Therefore,
for all α ∈ R, she decides to accept the spending offer of the party leader given by (1). In
what follows, we turn to the party leader’s decision about α that defines the reward for the
politician’s loyalty and discipline.
Party leader’s choice of α The party leader realizes that the politician will accept his
offer and will implement policy x (α) given by (2). The party leader’s utility uL (·) is then
equal to
uL (α) = v (l − x (α))− s (x (α)) =
{




























, and is strictly decreasing for

















−v (0) and is higher than his utility when he makes no spending offer to the
politician (which is v (l)). The politician gets utility Pr (α∗) = F (v (0)) while the voter gets
utility uV (α
∗) = v (0), which are exactly equal to their utilities when no spending offer was
made by the party leader. Therefore, in equilibrium, the party leader gets all the gains from
the spending contract and just has to ensure that the politician’s participation constraint
binds. The spending contract is presented in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The party leader proposes the following spending contract to the politician
s (x) = max
[








The politician’s discipline and the resulting spending allocation are determined in equi-
librium, and, thus, both are endogenous. However, the model suggests that the two are
correlated. According to (4), the party leader will condition the allocation of discretionary
spending on the politician’s loyalty to the party line x, as well as on the intensity of conflict
between the constituency’s and leader’s policy preferences l. We turn now to the model’s
predictions which are tested in the following empirical analysis.
Prediction 1 : The more loyal the politician is to the party line, the larger the amount of
spending is allocated to her constituency: ∂s∂x ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, l].
Intuitively, the model suggests that the party leader opts for the loyalty reward that
maps a policy to a spending allocation. The closer the chosen policy to the party line (i.e.,
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the more disciplined the politician), the higher the spending is channeled to the politician’s
constituency. Therefore, we expect a positive association between the politician’s loyalty to
her party and the discretionary spending allocated to her home district.
Prediction 2 : The effect of the politician’s loyalty on discretionary spending is larger the
more intense the conflict of interest between the voter’s and the party leader’s preferences:
∂2s
∂x∂l ≥ 0.
This interaction effect between party discipline and conflict intensity reflects the innate
nature of party loyalty. The politician’s support for the party line does not necessarily imply
she is being loyal to the party. In particular, in the absence of conflict between the voter’s
and the party leader’s interests, the politician would face no trade-off. Then, supporting the
party line would be a by-product of following her constituency’s interests rather than a sign
of party discipline and so does not have to be rewarded by the party leader. In turn, a conflict
between the voter’s and the party leader’s preferences leads to a trade-off for the politician.
In this case, there is room for party discipline that has to be rewarded by the party leader.
The more intense the conflict of interest, the larger the trade-off is faced by the politician
and thus the more she will be rewarded for a given level of party loyalty. As a result, not
only does more party loyalty increase the amount of spending allocated to the politician’s
constituency, but it also does so to a larger extent if the conflict between the voter’s and the
party leader’s interests deepens.
4 Empirical Analysis
In the empirical analysis, we study the relationship between party discipline and the allocation
of public spending using district-level data on members of the U.S. House of Representatives
and federal expenditures for the 1986-2010 period. We restrict the analysis to the House of
Representatives because the Senate is composed of multi-member districts, and it is therefore
hard to clearly relate the behavior of a legislator to the amount of spending her district
receives. In contrast, the House of Representatives is composed of single-member districts.
In what follows, we describe the methodology and data, and then present our results.
4.1 Empirical Approach
To test the two hypotheses presented in Section 3, we estimate the effect of party discipline
on discretionary spending with the following regressions:
yit = β1Unityit +X
′
itΩ + µi + δt + uit, (5)
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yit = β1Unityit+β2Unityit×Conflict intensityit+β3Conflict intensityit+X
′
itΩ+µi+δt+uit, (6)
where i denotes congressional districts, t denotes fiscal years, δt captures time effects, and µi
refers to district fixed effects, where districts are constant units within each decennial census
to address the complex issue of redistricting. Our dependent variable yit is the log of discre-
tionary spending per capita, in 2010 dollars (inflation adjusted). Following DeBacker (2011),
we exclude continuing payments originated in previous years and only include new payments
for which legislators can clearly claim credit. The main explanatory variable, party discipline,
is captured by party unity scores (Unityit). These scores account for the frequency with which
legislators vote in agreement with the party line on the floor of the House.14 Further, we use
district-level vote shares in the preceding presidential election as proxies for district ideology
and measure the degree of conflict faced by a legislator (Conflict intensityit) with her dis-
trict’s vote share of the presidential candidate affiliated with the opposing party. In other
words, conflict is measured as the vote share of the Republican (Democratic) presidential
candidate if the legislator is Democrat (Republican). Below we provide detailed description
of these variables.
We also include in our regressions a set of district-level political variables (X
′
itΩ) to capture
the possibility that members with a certain partisanship have an agenda-setting advantage
that helps them secure funding. This would be the case for members affiliated with the
President’s party (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010), and members of the House majority
(Cox and McCubbins 1993; Albouy 2013). In addition, to account for different spending
preferences across the Democratic and Republican parties (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009), we
include in our regressions a binary variable that equals one if a representative is Republican.
As in Dynes and Huber (2015), we add two binary variables that indicate whether the district
is Republican-leaning and the President is Republican or the district is Republican-leaning
and the House is controlled by Republicans.15
Socioeconomic variables such as unemployment and age structure may affect the spending
needs of the population in a district. They are, however, not included as controls because
they are available only at the district level from the decennial censuses. As these data do not
vary within districts, they are captured by µi.
14Recall that the budget of a certain fiscal year t is approved during the previous year. In the process of
approving the federal budget, members add pork to appropriation bills and exchange loyalty for spending that
will be disbursed during the following year. Thus, rewards happen contemporaneously, which is in line with
the quote from Pearson (2008) in Section 2.
15Although a legislator’s seniority, leadership positions or committee membership may affect her capacity
to attract funding to her district, they may also be the result of her level of party discipline. Therefore, these
variables are not included in our regressions.
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According to our model, spending and party discipline are chosen at the same time, which
poses an endogeneity threat. Moreover, the level of conflict a legislator is exposed to may
also affect her roll call votes. To address this issue, we lag party unity scores two years and
use this lagged variable as an instrument for current discipline. In the next section, we show
that past discipline explains a large proportion of variation of current discipline and it is a
strong instrument. In addition, for the instrument to be valid, lagged discipline should only
be correlated with spending through current discipline. We argue that this is fulfilled because
elections to the House of Representatives take place every two years and this means that our
instrument captures voting behavior of legislators in the previous legislature.16 We believe
it is unlikely that party leaders can credibly commit to reward legislators with pork-barrel
spending in the next term (in two years) given that they do not know their electoral prospects
(they may no longer be in Congress, or, if they are, they may face different constraints).
Provided that our measure of pork barrel only considers new payments and not multi-year
projects, it is quite improbable that the type of spending we analyze has been agreed in the
previous legislature.
It is important to ensure that our instrument is not correlated with the degree of conflict
between the voters’ and party’s interests. We can only guarantee this lack of correlation in
the two first years of a presidential term. So, our empirical analysis is restricted to fiscal
years (FY) 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2010.17 We
explain with an example why we restrict the sample to these years. As Table 1 shows, the
budget for FY1986 is passed in 1985. Party leaders consider the level of party discipline and
conflict that party members face in 1985; the level of conflict is measured using the results
of the preceding presidential election (1984). In this case, the instrument (party discipline in
1983) cannot be the outcome of the level of conflict in the future (1984).18 In the two last
years of a presidential term, lagged party discipline (our instrument) can be the outcome of
the level of conflict (see for instance, FY1988 in Table 1).
16With a two-year lag of party discipline we drop freshman representatives from our sample. Lagging
our explanatory variable an additional year would drop many more observations as it would require that
a representative is in office during three Congresses. Given that a two-year lag already ensures that party
discipline is based on roll call votes in a previous legislature, we do not think that a further time lag would
improve our identification strategy.
17After each decennial census, the number of congressional districts per state is adjusted using the new
population counts while ensuring that each state has at least one district. This process is known as reappor-
tionment. Fiscal year 2003 is excluded from the sample because of congressional reapportionment.
18Note that US presidential elections take place in November, so they influence the behavior of legislators
from the following year onwards.
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Table 1: Timing
Fiscal year Unity scores Instrument Presidential election
1986 1985 1983 1984
1987 1986 1984 1984
1988 1987 1985 1984
1989 1988 1986 1984
1990 1989 1987 1988
1991 1990 1988 1988
1992 1991 1989 1988
1993 1992 1990 1988
1994 1993 1991 1992
1995 1994 1992 1992
1996 1995 1993 1992
1997 1996 1994 1992
1998 1997 1995 1996
1999 1998 1996 1996
2000 1999 1997 1996
2001 2000 1998 1996
2002 2001 1999 2000
2003 2002 2000 2000
2004 2003 2001 2000
2005 2004 2002 2000
2006 2005 2003 2004
2007 2006 2004 2004
2008 2007 2005 2004
2009 2008 2006 2004
2010 2009 2007 2008
Note: The figures in this table are to be read as follows: the Federal
budget of FY1986 is passed in 1985. The unity scores of reference for
FY1986 are those of year 1985 (instrumented with party unity scores in
1983). The presidential election outcomes of 1984 are used to measure




In this section, we provide further details on the variables mentioned above, including data
sources and descriptive statistics.
Discretionary spending
Data on federal spending in congressional districts come from Dynes and Huber (2015) who
assembled and cleaned the information provided by the Federal Assistance Awards Data
System (FAADS) to examine another issue—namely, the affiliation with the President’s party
and the allocation of federal grants. This information accounts for approximately half of
the federal budget.19 We focus our analysis on spending that is susceptible to political
manipulation and follow previous work that classifies spending into high-variance and low-
variance programs based on their coefficient of variation (see, e.g., DeBacker 2011; Levitt
and Snyder 1995; Dynes and Huber 2015; Berry, Burden and Howell 2010).20 High-variance
spending is commonly associated with discretionary spending as it is usually not formula-
based, and it tends to fund smaller programs that are more susceptible to targeting. All
programs with a coefficient of variation greater than or equal to one are classified as pork-
barrel spending.21 As mentioned previously, we restrict the analysis to new payments. High-
variation spending is arguably not a perfect measure of pork-barrel spending. However, pure
distributive spending (i.e., earmarks in appropriation bills) is available only at the state level.
Aggregating party discipline at that level would dismiss important information as there is a
big divergence within states. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the thirty largest programs,
in terms of per capita spending, classified as high-variation programs.
The federal budget of a certain fiscal year is approved during the previous year. This
means, for instance, that the pork-barrel expenditures of FY1995 were passed in 1994 by
19An alternative source, which contains most of the federal budget, is the Consolidated Federal Funds
Report (CFFR). However, CFFR information is at the state level, and this does not allow us to identify with
precision the recipients of federal funds.
20The coefficient of variation of each program is computed as follows. The standard deviation of the
program’s outlays across all districts in fiscal year t is divided by the mean of its outlays across all districts in
t and then the mean of this across all years is computed. We exclude from this computation the districts that
cross boundaries with state capitals. The reason is that spending allocated to state capitals is often spread
among several districts. See Dynes and Huber (2015) for further details.
21This cutoff corresponds to a natural break observed at the lower end of a histogram of the coefficients of
variation. The cutoff used by Dynes and Huber (2015) is 1.0, that used by Levitt and Snyder (1995) is 0.67,
and that used by DeBacker (2011) is 1.2. As we show in the robustness section, moving this cutoff does not
significantly change our results.
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legislators elected in the 1992 election. Federal spending in districts that include state capitals
may be noisy, and for this reason we exclude these districts. We also disregard districts that,
due to the early resignation or death of their representatives, have multiple occupants in a
given year.
We collect population figures from the U.S. Census to express federal outlays in per-capita
terms. Population at the district level is available only in decennial censuses (i.e., in 1980,
1990, and 2000).22 However, we can obtain an estimate of the district population using the
state population estimates provided yearly by the U.S. Census and dividing them by the
number of congressional districts in each year.23
Party discipline
We combine the data on federal spending with information on party discipline in the House of
Representatives. Following the previous literature (e.g., Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Carson
et al. 2010), we use party unity scores as an indicator of party loyalty in policy voting.
This is our main explanatory variable (Unity). Party unity scores are available for each
legislator in any given year. They are computed as the percentage of roll-call votes in which
a representative voted “yea” or “nay” in agreement with her party when the majority of one
party voted against the majority of the other party.24 The variable is standardized (mean
of zero and standard deviation of one) such that coefficients associated to Unity can be
interpreted as the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in party discipline.
Data on party unity scores are collected from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. As
shown in Figure 1, unity scores were, on average, around 70% in the early 1980s, but they
increased significantly during the following decades and today total 90%. The blue (red)
horizontal lines in Figure 1 represent the years of a Democrat (Republican) majority.
Conflict
One of the main predictions of our theoretical model is that the effect of discipline on dis-
cretionary spending is larger the more intense the conflict of interest between the voters’
preferences and the party line. Our main measure of conflict faced by a legislator is her
22http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html
23We can make this imputation because all congressional districts within a state are meant to have similar
population sizes.
24Party discipline becomes especially visible in this context of confrontation. During the years 1986-2010,
Democrats and Republicans voted against each other, on average, in 53% of all roll-call votes in the House of
Representatives.
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Figure 1: Party discipline and party control in the House of Representatives
Notes: Congressional Quarterly Annual Report, January 2011. Blue (red) vertical bars cor-
respond to Democratic (Republican) control. The solid blue lines represent the average unity
score of the Democratic (Republican) party. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
district’s vote share of a presidential candidate affiliated with the other party, i.e., the vote
share of a Republican (Democratic) presidential candidate if the legislator is Democrat (Re-
publican). This captures the degree of conflict and it is our preferred measure as it has some
variation over time within districts. The variable is standardized (mean of zero and standard
deviation of one). Data on presidential elections at the congressional district level comes
from Jacobson (2015).
As a robustness check, we replace the continuous measure of conflict with a binary variable
that equals one if a Republican legislator represents a district with an average presidential
vote share of the Democratic party above the national average, or if a Democrat represents
a district with an average presidential vote share of the Republican party above the national
average. In other words, Conflict dummy identifies Republican representatives in liberal-
leaning districts and Democratic representatives in conservative-leaning districts. In our
sample, 30% of legislators are in this setting. However, this figure varies considerably over
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the years: it drops from 40% initially to 21% in the last year of our sample.
Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables included
in our regressions.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Party Discipline and Discretionary Spending
In Table 2 we show the effect of party discipline on discretionary spending estimating the
regression in equation (5) using ordinary least squares (Panel A) and instrumental variables
(Panel B). We include year and district fixed effects in all specifications.25 In column 3 we
add region-by-year dummies for each of the four Census regions and in column 4 we include
division-by-year dummies for the nine Census divisions.26 By including region-by-year and
division-by-year effects, we can account to a certain extent for the shifts in voters’ preferences
that are specific to a certain area (e.g., some southern areas have become more conservative
over the years, while the Northeast has become more liberal).
Estimates in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in party
discipline increases spending per capita by approximately 7%. The estimates remain highly
significant when we include political controls (column 2) and region- and division-by-year
dummies (columns 3 and 4). If spending is directed towards less loyal party members in order
to increase their discipline and this is effective, then the OLS estimates may underestimate
the true effect of party discipline on spending. The results in Panel B suggest that this is
the case and there is a large bias. The point estimate in column 2 shows that a one-standard
deviation increase in unity scores raises pork-barrel spending by approximately 18%. The
results remain statistically significant across all specifications. Panel A of Table A.3 in the
Appendix presents the first stage estimates. Lagged unity scores are highly relevant to explain
current levels of discipline. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic in the first stage regression
exceeds the Stock and Yogo critical value at 10% maximal IV relative bias. So we reject the
hypothesis that the instrument is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Although party leaders of the House majority and the President’s party may enjoy some
legislative advantage, we do not find that loyal members of the House majority or President’s
party are rewarded to a greater extent. In Table A.4 in the Appendix, we show that the
interaction terms Unity ×Majority party and Unity × President′s party are statistically
25Recall that by “district” we mean district by census.
26See regions and divisions established by the U.S. Census in https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/
maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf
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Table 2: Party discipline and spending in U.S. congressional districts, 1986-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Unity 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.077***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 4.575*** 4.687*** 4.850*** 4.887***
(0.011) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
R2 0.168 0.169 0.178 0.177
Panel B: IV estimates
Unity 0.138*** 0.183*** 0.186*** 0.195***
(0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055)
Constant 4.578*** 4.727*** 4.801*** 4.806***
(0.011) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses,
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district-
by-census fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of High-Variance
(i.e., discretionary) spending per capita. Unity is standardized. State
capitals, district-year observations with multiple occupants, and districts
with freshman representatives are not included. Region-by-year effects inter-
act four region dummies and division-by-year effects interact nine division
dummies. The sample is restricted to the first two years of presidential terms.
Political controls in columns 2-4 include President′s party, Majority party,
Republican, House is Republican × District has Republican partisanship,
President is Republican × District has Republican partisanship,
Winning presidential candidate′s margin in state.
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insignificant.
5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Party Discipline
The second prediction of our theoretical model is that a larger gap between constituents’
and party’s preferences increases the rewards for party discipline. In Table 3, we show the
estimates of the heterogeneous effects as specified in equation (6). Panel A presents the OLS
results as a baseline. However, we cannot make any causal interpretation as, in addition to
the simultaneity bias, the inclusion of a potentially bad control (Conflict intensity) may bias
the results further. The results in Panel A suggest that a one-standard deviation increase
in Conflict intensity raises the rewards for party discipline by 2%. Although the sign of the
coefficient goes in the expected direction and the size is similar across the specifications, the
effect is imprecisely estimated. The IV results in panel B provide more robust estimates and
suggest that increasing Conflict intensity by one standard deviation raises the rewards for
party discipline by about 5%. This heterogeneous effect is statistically significant in all the
specifications except column 4 where we include division-by-year fixed effects. However, the
point estimate is the same as in column 3, which suggests that the lack of significant effects
is only due to the lack of within-variation of Conflict intensity. Panel B of Table A.3 in the
Appendix presents the first stage estimates.
5.3 Additional Results and Robustness
The estimates reported in the previous sections provide clear evidence that party loyalty
is associated with larger amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the corresponding
districts. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced the larger the conflict between the con-
stituency’s interests and the party line. In what follows, we run several robustness checks to
validate our previous findings. All results correspond to the second stage of two-stage least
square regressions.
Potential confounders
As a robustness check, we investigate whether the heterogeneous effects of party loyalty arise
because of the different levels of conflict intensity and not because of other factors that are
correlated with such conflict. To test this, we include in equation (6) interaction terms
between the variable Unity and different potential confounding factors that are correlated
with the variable Conflict intensity and may impact the allocation of public spending. The
results are presented in Table 4. A representative elected in a district with low support for her
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Table 3: Party discipline and federal spending: heterogeneous effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Unity 0.059** 0.062** 0.071*** 0.071***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Unity × Conflict intensity 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.015
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Conflict intensity -0.006 -0.013 -0.015 -0.021
(0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047)
Constant 4.581*** 4.703*** 4.862*** 4.902***
(0.013) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
R2 0.168 0.169 0.178 0.177
Panel B: IV estimates
Unity 0.110** 0.141** 0.157*** 0.163***
(0.045) (0.056) (0.057) (0.060)
Unity × Conflict intensity 0.053** 0.065** 0.051* 0.051
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Conflict intensity 0.024 0.027 0.022 0.017
(0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Constant 4.598*** 4.748*** 4.745*** 4.829***
(0.016) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district-by-census fixed effects.
The dependent variable is the log of High-Variance spending per capita. Unity and Con-
flict intensity are standardized variables. Conflict intensity is the presidential vote share
of the Democratic party if the district representative is Republican and the presidential
vote share of the Republican party if the district representative is Democrat. State
capitals, district-year observations with multiple occupants, and districts with freshman
representatives are not included. Political controls as in Table 2.
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party is likely to have faced intense electoral competition and therefore to have been elected in
a close election. Thus, in columns 1 and 2 we add an interaction term between party discipline
and a dummy for close congressional elections (vote margin below 5%). Moreover, in columns
3 and 4 we include an interaction term between party unity and the legislator’s vote margin in
the last congressional election. We do so to account for the legislator’s popularity or valence,
which may affect its capacity to secure funds. Finally, Republican-leaning districts are less
likely to elect a representative affiliated with the Democratic party. To control for this fact, in
columns 5 and 6 we add an interaction term between party unity and a district’s Republican
tendency.27
The only interaction that is statistically significant in Table 4 is that of Unity × Vote
margin. If the vote margin captures to a certain extent the valence of legislators, then the
results in columns 3 and 4 suggest that more competent legislators extract more rewards.
Importantly, our interaction effect of interest Unity × Conflict intensity remains statistically
significant in all specifications except in column 6 (where it is imprecisely estimated), and its
magnitude is similar to the previous results presented in Table 3.
Alternative measures of key variables
As an additional robustness check to validate our previous findings, we test the sensitivity of
the results to the definition of discretionary spending. We apply two additional thresholds to
classify spending into low- and high-variance programs. The estimates are presented in Table
A.5 of the Appendix. In columns 1-3 we set the threshold at 1.12 (as in DeBacker, 2011) and
in columns 4-5 at 0.67 (as in Levitt and Snyder, 1995). The results are robust to the change
in the definition of the outcome variable: the sign of the coefficient of interest remains the
same (positive) and the magnitude of the effect is similar to our previous estimates.
As a placebo test, we estimate the effect of party discipline on low-variance spending. This
type of spending is usually formula-based and thus is more difficult to manipulate. Therefore,
we expect no significant relationship. The results in Table A.6 of the Appendix reveal that,
indeed, party discipline plays no role in the distribution of non-discretionary spending.
Finally, we examine whether the heterogeneous effects of party discipline are robust to a
different definition of conflict. We replace our continuous measure of conflict with a dummy
variable that equals one if a Republican legislator represents a liberal-leaning district or a
Democratic legislator represents a conservative-leaning district. Table A.7 in the Appendix
27This variable measures the Republican orientation of congressional districts based on average presidential
election returns. This variable has no variation over time within district-by-census units. The original variable
(from Dynes and Huber, 2015) ranges from -1 to 1 but in our analysis it is a standardized variable.
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Table 4: Potential confounding factors. IV estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unity 0.109** 0.157*** 0.107** 0.156*** 0.110** 0.157***
(0.045) (0.057) (0.045) (0.057) (0.045) (0.057)
Unity × Conflict intensity 0.053** 0.051* 0.058** 0.057* 0.062** 0.052
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Conflict intensity 0.008 0.008 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.023
(0.041) (0.050) (0.043) (0.051) (0.042) (0.051)
Unity × Close election 0.023 -0.005
(0.081) (0.080)
Close election 0.222** 0.207**
(0.103) (0.096)
Unity × Vote margin 0.049*** 0.044**
(0.018) (0.018)
Vote margin
Unity × District Republican tendency -0.026 -0.004
(0.050) (0.051)
Constant 4.593*** 4.779*** 4.592*** 4.819*** 4.597*** 4.793***
(0.016) (0.060) (0.016) (0.062) (0.016) (0.067)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region-by-year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All
specifications include year and district-by-census fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of High-
Variance spending per capita. Unity, Conflict intensity, Vote margin, and District Republican tendency
are standardized variables. Conflict intensity is the presidential vote share of the Democratic party if
the district representative is Republican and the presidential vote share of the Republican party if the
district representative is Democrat. State capitals, district-year observations with multiple occupants,
and districts with freshman representatives are not included. Political controls as in previous tables.
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summarizes the results. The point estimates in column 1 indicate that increasing party unity
by one standard deviation raises discretionary spending per capita by 9.9% in districts where
legislators face no conflict of interest. This effect nearly doubles when such conflict exists.
This result remains significant when we include a set of political controls (column 2). When
we add region-by-year and division-by-year effects (columns 3 and 4) the point estimate of
the interaction term is less precisely estimated, most probably because this strategy removes
considerable variation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate theoretically and empirically the impact of party discipline on
the distribution of discretionary spending. In our context, party discipline refers to the ability
of party leaders to ensure that party members support the party line. Following the party line
might be electorally costly for legislators as it may go against their constituents’ interests. In
these instances, the party leaders might have to reward the legislators. One of such reward
is discretionary spending targeted to the legislators’ constituencies. Discretionary grants are
often viewed as unproductive federal spending used to fund targeted projects, which are
sometimes referred to as “bridges to nowhere.” However, the party leaders have certain levels
of power to allocate discretionary grants and thus can use them to influence legislators to
vote along the party line.
We develop a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between the con-
stituents’ preferences and the party’s interests. Following the party line (i.e., being loyal) is
electorally costly for the politician. To offset electoral punishment, the party leader rewards
the politician’s loyalty with discretionary spending allocated to her constituency. Our model
predicts that party discipline leads to larger amounts of targeted spending. Moreover, this
effect is more pronounced the larger the conflict between the party’s interests and the voters’
preferences.
We test the predictions of our model using district-level data on U.S. federal spending
and party discipline in the House of Representatives over the 1986-2010 period. Our find-
ings suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in party discipline raises discretionary
spending by 18% on average. We also find that increasing conflict intensity by one stan-
dard deviation raises the rewards for discipline by about 5%. These findings are in line with
our theoretical model, according to which representatives face a tougher trade-off in those
districts were constituents’ and party’s preferences differ the most and thus demand higher
rewards for supporting the party line.
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From a more general perspective, our study emphasizes the impacts of party loyalty on
federal spending while the existing literature has mainly focused on the political consequences
of party discipline. This emphasis allows us to disclose additional sources of uneven distri-
bution of federal grants, namely, representatives’ loyalty to party lines and conflict between
constituents’ and party’s interests. Therefore, our findings complement the existing literature
and suggest that various studies on federal spending may benefit from taking party discipline
and conflict intensity into account.
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10.551 Food stamp program 682.85
81.13 Carbon capture and storage-FutureGen 2.0 443.23
93.784 Federal reimbursement of emergency health services furnished to undocumented 181.69
15.DAW Southern Nevada public land management act 171.26
20.319 High-speed rail corridors and intercity psngr rail svc-cap. assist grants 154.37
84.010 Title I grants to local education agencies 62.47
14.871 Section 8 housing choice vouchers 52.08
20.804 Operating-differential subsidies 47.72
10.561 State administrative matching grants for food stamp program 39.12
11.553 Special projects 37.49
84.027 Special education-grants to states 33.73
84.295 Ready to learn television 33.67
12.RED Assistance to the red cross via DDSW 33.63
20.205 Highway planning and construction 26.13
93.658 Foster care title IV-E 20.93
14.311 Single family property disposition 20.72
11.477 Fisheries disaster relief 20.30
81.131 Expand and extend clean coal power initiative 18.85
11.557 Broadband technology opportunities program (BTOP) 18.75
10.787 Broadband initiatives program - recovery 16.78
14.195 Section 8 housing assistance payments program-special allocations 16.56
15.235 Southern Nevada public land management 16.43
93.667 Social services block grant 16.37
12.DAC Women in services memorial foundation 16.23
97.024 Emergency food and shelter national board program 16.02
11.617 Congressionally identified projects 15.82
14.256 Neighborhood stabilization program (recovery act funded) 15.53
19.4 Educational exchange-graduate students (Fulbright program) 14.67
15.531 Part F - discretionary grants 14.65
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Log(High-variation spending per capita) 4.507 1.153 -0.708 8.513
Log(Low-variation spending per capita) 1.054 2.34 -10.581 5.229
Party unity 0 1 -5.735 1.059
Conflict intensity 0 1 -3.082 2.704
Conflict dummy 0.299 0.458 0 1
President’s party 0.473 0.499 0 1
Majority party 0.572 0.495 0 1
Republican 0.447 0.497 0 1
Repub. President × District Republican tendency -0.006 0.108 -0.515 0.293
Repub. House × District Republican tendency -0.004 0.092 -0.413 0.293
District Republican tendency 0 1 -3.687 2.178
Close election 0.027 0.162 0 1
Vote margin 0 1 -1.53 1.985
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Table A.3: First stage of two-stage least square regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Homogeneous effects
Lagged unity 0.562*** 0.533*** 0.534*** 0.524***
(0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 189.34 134.04 131.29 125.64
Panel B: Heterogeneous effects
Lagged unity 0.590*** 0.565*** 0.558*** 0.546***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 86.89 62.07 61.37 58.54
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district-by-census fixed ef-
fects. State capitals, district-year observations with multiple occupants, and dis-
tricts with freshman representatives are not included. The point estimates in panels
A and B correspond to the first stages of the 2SLS regressions in Panel B of tables
2 and 3, respectively. The instrument (lagged unity) is a two-year lag of party
unity scores.
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Table A.4: Does partisanship influence the rewards for party discipline?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Unity 0.063** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.052* 0.061** 0.062**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Unity × Majority party 0.018 0.012 0.005
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Unity × President’s party 0.039 0.033 0.031
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Majority party -0.024 -0.023 -0.031 -0.038 -0.033 -0.039
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042)
President’s party -0.015 -0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Constant 4.687*** 4.849*** 4.887*** 4.685*** 4.848*** 4.884***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
Panel B: IV estimates
Unity 0.161*** 0.174*** 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.203***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062)
Unity × Majority party 0.061 0.035 0.034
(0.051) (0.054) (0.057)
Unity × President’s party -0.016 -0.017 -0.019
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
Majority party -0.061 -0.065 -0.077* -0.071 -0.068 -0.078
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048)
President’s party -0.032 -0.029 -0.024 -0.018 -0.021 -0.017
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Constant 4.727*** 4.770*** 4.809*** 4.728*** 4.801*** 4.808***
(0.062) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) (0.060)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No Yes No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
All specifications include year and district-by-census fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
log of High-Variance spending per capita. Unity is a standardized variable. Majority party and
President’s party are dummy variables that indicate whether the legislator is affiliated with the
House majority party or President’s party, respectively. Sample restrictions and political controls
as in table 2.
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Table A.5: Alternative measures of discretionary spending.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Threshold = 1.12 Threshold = 0.67
Panel A: Homogeneous effects
Unity 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.177*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.138***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.059) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046)
Constant 4.455*** 4.490*** 4.482*** 4.871*** 4.963*** 4.965***
(0.072) (0.068) (0.069) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056)
Panel B: Heterogeneous effects
Unity 0.108* 0.124** 0.131** 0.085* 0.098** 0.107**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.047) (0.048) (0.051)
Unity × Conflict intensity 0.100*** 0.073** 0.073** 0.062** 0.043* 0.040
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Conflict intensity 0.041 0.031 0.024 0.008 0.002 -0.003
(0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048)
Constant 4.486*** 4.553*** 4.504*** 4.893*** 4.982*** 5.000***
(0.074) (0.071) (0.076) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No Yes No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All
specifications include year and district-by-census fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of High-
Variance spending per capita. In columns 1-3, the threshold to classify high-variance spending is 1.12,
while in columns 4-6 it is 0.67. Unity and Conflict intensity are standardized variables. Conflict intensity
is the presidential vote share of the Democratic party if the district representative is Republican and
the presidential vote share of the Republican party if the district representative is Democrat. Sample
restrictions and political controls as in previous tables. The point estimates in this table correspond to
the second stage of 2SLS regressions.
33
Table A.6: Party discipline and non-discretionary spending.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Homogeneous effects Heterogeneous effects
Unity 0.303 -0.095 -0.134 -0.347 -0.503 -0.352
(0.524) (0.581) (0.586) (0.818) (0.861) (0.904)
Unity × Conflict intensity 0.994 0.679 0.461
(0.902) (0.833) (0.878)
Conflict intensity 0.395 0.254 0.371
(0.989) (0.963) (1.018)
Constant 5.174*** 9.793*** 13.017*** 5.455*** 10.026*** 13.207***
(1.095) (0.955) (0.995) (1.251) (1.055) (1.106)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No Yes No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All
specifications include year and district-by-census fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of Low-
Variance spending per capita. Party unity and Conflict intensity are standardized variables. Conflict
intensity is the presidential vote share of the Democratic party if the district representative is Republican
and the presidential vote share of the Republican party if the district representative is Democrat. Sample
restrictions and political controls as in previous tables. The point estimates in this table correspond to
the second stage of 2SLS regressions.
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Table A.7: Heterogeneous effects of party discipline: alternative measure of conflict.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unity 0.099** 0.140** 0.159*** 0.169***
(0.047) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062)
Unity × Conflict dummy 0.090** 0.091** 0.064 0.056
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047)
Conflict dummy 0.074 0.069 0.061 0.052
(0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Constant 4.570*** 4.715*** 4.702*** 4.766***
(0.017) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
Number of observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-year effects No No Yes No
Division-by-year effects No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district-by-census fixed ef-
fects. The dependent variable is the log of High-Variance (i.e., discretionary)
spending per capita. Unity is standardized. Conflict dummy = 1 for Republi-
can legislators who represent liberal-leaning districts or Democrat legislators who
represent conservative-leaning districts. Sample restrictions and political controls
as in previous tables. The point estimates in this table correspond to the second
stage of 2SLS regressions.
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B Politician’s Maximization Problem and Proof of Lemma 3.1
Given that F ′ (·) > 0, the politician chooses policy x ∈ [0, l] to maximize
v (x) + max [v (l − x) + α, 0] =
{
v (x) + v (l − x) + α if x ≥ l − v−1 (−α) ,
v (x) if x < l − v−1 (−α) .
(7)
It is decreasing in x if l2 ≤ l − v





). It follows that





. However, if l2 > l − v






politician’s objective function (7) is non-monotone. In this case, there are two candidates
for maximum, namely, arg maxx∈[0,l] [v (x) + v (l − x) + α] = l2 and arg maxx∈[0,l] v (x) = 0.





+α and v (0), respectively. It follows that the



































































C Policy- and Office-Motivated Party Leader
Consider the model’s setting with the following change. Suppose that the party leader cares
not only about the policy outcome but also about the politician’s reelection chances. His
utility is given by
uL (x, s) = v (l − x) + F (v (x) + s)− s.
As in the benchmark case, the leader wants the politician to internalize his losses v (l − x)
from the implemented policy x and so will condition discretionary spending s on these losses:
s (x) = max [v (l − x) + α, 0] .
The politician’s problem is the same as in the benchmark case. We turn next to the leader’s
choice of α. The party leader realizes that the politician will accept his offer and will imple-
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ment policy x (α) given by (2). The party leader’s utility uL (·) is then equal to






















The party leader chooses α to maximize uL (α), which is constant at v (l) + F (v (0)) for









































∣∣f−1 (1)∣∣− 2v ( l2)] ,
and offers the following spending contract to the politician
s (x) = max
[








∣∣f−1 (1)∣∣− 2v ( l2)] , 0] .
Notice furthermore, that ∂s∂x ≥ 0 and
∂2s
∂x∂l ≥ 0, as in the benchmark case. Therefore, the
model predictions are robust to considering the policy- and office-motivated party leader.
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